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Abstract 
The focus of the microeconomic technology adoption literature has been on the adoption and 
diffusion of new innovations: who adopts, and when they adopt.  Implicit in the literature is that 
consumers will embrace the product that results from the use of the new technology. If producers 
have reason to believe that adopting a new technology may lead consumers to perceive 
differentiated products, then the decision of  whether or not to adopt needs to consider not only 
the effectiveness of the new technology but also the consumer response to it. That is, producers 
have to incorporate the impact of consumer-driven market-level effects into their technology 
choice decisions. In these situations, producers considering the adoption of a new agricultural 
biotechnology have a more complex learning problem than the technology adoption literature 
generally addresses, because producers need to consider the interaction of demand and supply 
effects from the adoption of any new technology. We motivate our analysis with the case of 
recombinant bovine somatotropin (rbST). In order to address some of these issues, we construct 
an analytical model of technology adoption that considers a market with differentiated goods. 
We develop a multi-period economic model of a representative  farmer’s technology choice 
decision  and integrate it into a market-level analysis that links the industry’s use of the 
technology to the structure of consumer demand.  
 
   2 
 
Introduction 
A key feature of endogenous economic growth theory is that innovation and the adoption of 
productivity-enhancing technologies is important to long run growth. At the macroeconomic 
level, countries that invest in research and development reap the rewards of their investment 
through higher growth rates. At the microeconomic level, firms and producers that adopt new 
technologies may earn greater profits and invest these profits in research and development. The 
focus  of the microeconomic technology adoption  literature  has been on the adoption and 
diffusion of new innovations: who adopts, and when they adopt.  The assumption that is implicit 
in the literature is that consumers will embrace the product that results from the use of the new 
technology. In the case of process innovations, this has generally been the case. Process 
innovations do not alter the final outputs, only the manner in which they are produced, and so do 
not affect consumers’ utility from the good,  except through any price reductions. While the 
majority of these innovations have been readily accepted by consumers, the advances made in 
agricultural biotechnology have shown that exceptions do occur. We motivate our analysis with 
the case of recombinant bovine somatotropin (rbST), but are interested more generally in the 
adoption of agricultural biotechnology and the effects of consumer preferences on adoption. In 
order to address some of these issues, we construct an analytical model of technology adoption 
that considers a market with differentiated goods. 
In the last two decades, goods produced using agricultural biotechnology have accounted 
for an increasing share of agricultural output in the U.S. and worldwide. The first generation of 
genetically modified (GM) products is characterized by having traits that offer no direct benefit 
to consumers (e.g., herbicide-resistant crops), but offer enhanced productivity or reduce costs for 
producers.  The Roundup Ready crops that are herbicide-resistant and the Bt crops that are 3 
 
insecticide-resistant are two of the most well known and successful GM products. While 
government agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the producers who 
use these technologies insist that there is no difference between goods produced with or without 
these technologies, the evidence suggests that many consumers do not view these products as 
being identical to their non-GM counterparts  (Huffman et al., 2003; Noussair, Robin and 
Ruffieux, 2004). One of the clearest examples of this has been the case of rbST, a GM growth 
hormone that stimulates milk production in cows and improves the efficiency with which cows 
can convert feed into milk. 
Dairy producers have not adopted rbST to the extent predicted by many earlier studies 
(Centner and Lathrop, 1996; Caswell, Fuglie and Klotz, 1994; Raboy and Simpson, 1993; 
Lesser, Bernard and Billah, 1999) and the consumer backlash against milk from cows treated 
with rbST appears to be greater than it has been for some other GM products.  If producers have 
reason to believe that adopting a new technology may lead consumers to perceive differentiated 
products, then the decision of  whether or not to adopt needs to consider not only the 
effectiveness of the new technology but also the consumer response to it. That is, producers have 
to incorporate the impact of consumer-driven market-level effects into their technology choice 
decisions.  In these situations, producers considering the adoption of a new agricultural 
biotechnology have a more complex learning problem than the technology adoption literature 
generally addresses.  Producers must learn about the relative profitability of the new technology 
for themselves by taking into consideration the effects of technology on output and production 
costs, and must learn about the consumer response to the resulting product. In sum, producers 
need to consider the interaction of demand and supply effects from the adoption of any new 
technology. 4 
 
RbST is such a case. It is an output-enhancing technology for producers, but, according 
to some consumers, it is also a product-altering technology. However, neither of these claims is 
unanimous;  the heterogeneity of viewpoints on these matters is what makes rbST such an 
interesting case to study. On the supply side, some producers have had difficulty obtaining the 
same results as those reported in the animal science literature (see, for example, Bauman et al., 
1999), leading them to question the true profitability of the technology. Some producers adopted 
rbST, only to disadopt it later and return to their pre-existing technology; i.e., once they realized 
rbST was not profitable for them. On the demand side, from the outset consumers have been 
inundated with information from both sides. Proponents of rbST tell them that “milk is milk” 
(http://www.dairyreporter.com/Industry-markets/Milk-is-milk-campaign-reaches-thousands) 
whether it comes from cows treated or not treated with rbST. Opponents of rbST cite the paucity 
of research on the potential detrimental health effects of consuming milk from cows treated with 
rbST as well as the negative effects on the cows themselves. These competing messages have 
generated a great deal of uncertainty about the safety and quality of milk from cows treated with 
rbST, and whether or not the two milks are different. It is common nowadays to see cartons of 
milk with the label “milk produced by cows not treated with rbST”. This suggests that there are 
consumers who consider milk from cows treated with rbST to be different from milk that is 
produced by cows not treated with rbST. Some consumers have responded to the proliferation of 
labels differentiating rbST-free milk from conventional milk by choosing the former. This has 
prompted many large national retailers, such as Safeway, Wal-Mart and Kroger, to stock only 
rbST-free milk on their shelves.  
As consumers become more concerned about how their food  is produced and its 
implications for human health, animal health, and the environment, the adoption decision will 5 
 
need to consider the preferences and perceptions of consumers. It will not simply be a matter of 
whether adopting the technology will reduce costs; potential adopters will need to think whether 
the new innovation will render their products inferior or deficient or, alternatively, superior in 
any way  from consumers’ perspectives. Other researchers have considered the effects of 
consumer preferences on the adoption of GM technology (see Fernandez-Cornejo and Caswell 
(2006) for a summary), but they have not described in detail how that affects the producer’s 
adoption decision.  
This paper integrates elements from Stoneman (1981) and Lapan and Moschini (2004) in 
order to consider the market level effects on technology adoption. From the former, we use the 
framework of Bayesian updating to model how a producer learns about the profitability of a new 
technology  for him. From the latter, we consider the  effects of labeling and consumer 
preferences on the demand for GM products within a vertical differentiation framework.  We 
develop a multi-period economic model of a representative farmer’s technology choice decision 
and integrate it into a market-level analysis that links the industry’s use of the technology to the 
structure of consumer demand. Our model allows us to answer the following questions: (1) how 
do adoption and disadoption decisions change when a process innovation is perceived as a 
product (dis)innovation?; (2) what are the different diffusion paths that a GM technology may 
take under different learning scenarios on the part of producers and consumers?; and (3) what are 
the welfare implications if consumers perceive GM foods to be differentiated products? 
 
Background 
In recent years, there has been an increasing emphasis on how food is produced and whether or 
not these methods are environmentally sustainable, ethical and –  most importantly –  safe. 6 
 
Consumers have shown that they are willing to pay more for foods that are certified organic, and 
meat and eggs produced by animals in more “natural” environments attract premia vis-à-vis their 
“unnatural” counterparts. Many of the agricultural methods now being criticized were hailed as 
technological breakthroughs and the keys to cheaper food when they were first introduced. At 
the time, researchers and producers assumed that how the food was produced did not matter to 
consumers, and the only characteristics that mattered were those that were most tangible (e.g., 
taste, appearance and price). It appears that this is no longer the case. This has important 
implications for producers who are considering the adoption of a new technology.  When 
producers adopt an  agricultural biotechnology, not only are they adopting a new set of 
production practices but they may be –  wittingly or unwittingly –  producing a differentiated 
product in the eyes of the consumer. The technology adoption literature has generally focused on 
the benefits of the new technology to the potential adopter and has rarely considered it from the 
point of view of the consumer. Moreover, the literature has typically assumed that once a 
technology has been adopted, users do not abandon it and revert to their earlier technology. Once 
adoption occurs, it is assumed that the adopter will continue to use the technology until a newer, 
better technology replaces it. Both of these assumptions have been violated for a substantial 
share of producers in the case of rbST.  
  The literature on GM foods has focused either on how consumers perceive GM foods or 
on the adoption of GM technology by producers. Numerous analyses  have shown that some 
consumers – notably EU consumers – do perceive GM products to be different from their non-
GM counterparts. When this is the case, then process innovations that were initially intended to 
reduce production costs result in a  differentiated  inferior product.
1
                                                   
1 We acknowledge that some process innovations may lead consumers to perceive a superior product, but this has 
generally not been the case with the first generation of GM products. 
  However, sometimes the 7 
 
differentiation perceived by consumers occurs at a level that is difficult to detect. GM products 
have credence attributes that cannot be observed  through visual examination or experienced 
through consumption
2
  In general, process innovations in agricultural biotechnology have  not conferred any 
direct consumption benefits to the consumer, although they may have lowered prices. 
Nevertheless,  producers have readily adopted GM crop varieties and in 2007, GM crops 
accounted for 282.4 million acres worldwide (
 (Darby and Karni, 1973). Because most current GM foods are virtually 
indistinguishable from their traditional counterparts, consumers have no ability to differentiate 
the two in the absence of labels. In these cases, consumers demand that the products be 
segregated and that appropriate labels be used to distinguish the GM foods from the non-GM 
foods. 
www.ISAAA.org). In many cases, the adoption 
pattern for these innovations has followed the classic logistic, or S-shaped, pattern. For instance, 
U.S. producers who have adopted Bt crops and/or herbicide-resistant crops have continued using 
them and the abandonment rate has been low  (Fernandez-Cornejo, Alexander and Goodhue, 
2002). However, this has not been the case for all GM products. Producers have shown that they 
will adopt and then subsequently disadopt an innovation, as has been the case with rbST.  
Giannakas and Fulton (2002) and Lapan and Moschini (2004) both model the 
implications of introducing GM products into a market where (some) consumers have 
heterogeneous tastes and perceive the GM product to be a weakly inferior substitute.  Giannakas 
and Fulton focus on the welfare effects and show that, in the presence of market imperfections
3
                                                   
2 We ignore the possibility that GM goods may have negative observable health effects in the short run as this would 
make them experience goods, which would allow consumers to learn about their quality directly and differentiate 
them from their non-GM counterparts. 
3 For example, an innovator/monopolist who holds the intellectual property rights and extracts all the rent from the 
innovation via a technology fee.  
, 
the introduction of GM foods leads to a loss of consumer welfare as the cost-saving aspects of 8 
 
the technology are not passed along to the consumer.  They consider the welfare implications 
under scenarios of no labeling, mandatory labeling under full compliance and intentional 
mislabeling.   Lapan and Moschini (2004) model the trade implications from the introduction of 
GM products in which consumers from one country perceive the GM product to be a weakly 
inferior substitute  for  the traditional product. Simply introducing the GM product is costly 
because producers need to label and segregate the GM and non-GM products, as demanded by 
consumers. While Lapan and Moschini consider the adoption decision, they set up their model in 
such a way that the monopolist who sells the GM technology effectively decides the level of 
adoption. Within their framework, they demonstrate that introducing GM products lowers overall 
efficiency and welfare under certain conditions.  
  
Model 
Our analysis contributes to the literature by integrating product market considerations into the 
technology choice decision.  We consider the adoption of a process innovation; in this case, an 
agricultural biotechnology that reduces per-unit costs for the producer. The new technology has 
no observable impact on the final output but consumers consider it to be weakly inferior to the 
good produced using the existing  technology. This preference ordering may be due to  risk 
aversion (e.g., unknown long-term adverse health effects from consumption) or socio-political 
considerations  (e.g., it is morally  wrong to use genetic engineering). While consumers are 
heterogeneous in their taste parameters, at the same price all consumers prefer the good produced 
using the existing technology to the good produced using the new technology. That is, goods are 
vertically differentiated. While this is clearly a simplification
4
                                                   
4 For instance, some consumers may actually prefer a GM good if it was produced using fewer pesticides. 
, it is consistent with the stylized 9 
 
facts regarding consumers’ opinions and willingness-to-pay for GM products (Dhar and Foltz, 
2005). 
We model the impact of market effects on the technology choice decision by constructing 
an analytical model of technology choice that considers a market for  goods  differentiated by 
whether or not they are produced using the  new technology. We develop a multi-period 
economic model of a representative producer’s technology choice decision and integrate it into a 
market-level analysis that links the industry’s use of the technology to the structure of consumer 
demand  in order to determine the prices for both products. Consistent with the adoption 
literature, we model technology adoption and disadoption using a mean-variance approach to 
account for uncertainty and risk aversion (following Stoneman, 1981; and Tsur, Sternberg and  
Hochman, 1990), and specify that producers learn about the new technology in a Bayesian 
manner (see inter alia,  Fischer, Arnold and Gibbs, 1996; Jovanovich and Nyarko, 1996). 
Throughout, we assume that the producer is uncertain about the profitability of the new 
technology for him but knows how to use it, and is risk averse. Our assumption that the producer 
knows how to use the technology but is unsure of its profitability for him reflects the experience 
of U.S. farmers and GM technology. The choice variable is the extent to which the producer 
adopts the new technology.  
  At the beginning of each period t, a representative producer decides how intensively he 
will adopt the new technology. We assume the producer has an exponential utility function: 
(1)  𝑈𝑈(Π) = 1 −𝑒𝑒−𝜙𝜙Π,   
where Π is profit per animal (or unit of land) and 𝜙𝜙 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. It 
can be shown that, given an exponential utility function, the optimization problem that the 










The above is commonly referred to as a mean-variance utility function.  
The producer’s utility is essentially a function of his technology portfolio, or the extent to 
which he adopts the new technology. The initial adoption decision at 𝑡𝑡 = 0  depends on the 
producer’s prior belief about the profitability of the new technology. The old technology has 
returns  whose distribution is  time-invariant and normally distributed  𝑁𝑁(𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹,𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹
2), which  the 
producer knows with certainty.  The new (GM) technology also has returns that are distributed 
𝑁𝑁(𝜋𝜋 �𝐺𝐺,𝜎𝜎 �𝐺𝐺
2) and are time-invariant; however, in this case the producer does not know the true 
mean 𝜋𝜋 �𝐺𝐺 with certainty but he does know 𝜎𝜎 �𝐺𝐺
2, with 𝜎𝜎 �𝐺𝐺
2 ≥ 𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹
2. Instead, the producer has a prior 
belief regarding the true return at time t that is distributed 𝑁𝑁(𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡,𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
2 ). At time t, the producer 
realizes a return from the new technology yt and updates his prior in a Bayesian manner. Using 
Bayes’ theorem, the posterior density of the mean is 𝑁𝑁(𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡+1,𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡+1




2 + 𝜎𝜎 �𝐺𝐺
2𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡











2 + 𝜎𝜎 �𝐺𝐺
2. 
 
Returning to equation (2) for a moment and considering a producer who uses both technologies, 
the total profit at time t, Πt, is the sum of the anticipated returns and is distributed 𝑁𝑁(𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡,𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡
2), 
where 






2 + 2𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡(𝑁𝑁 − 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡)𝜌𝜌𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹,   11 
 




; and 𝜌𝜌 is the correlation between the two returns and 𝜌𝜌𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹 is the covariance. 
We decompose profit from using the old technology into 
𝜋𝜋𝐹𝐹(𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹) = 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹 − 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹(𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹),    
where we assume a constant marginal cost 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹
′ (𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹) > 0, and 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹 is fixed (i.e., the producer is a 
price taker). We assume that the output per animal 𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹 on the old technology is 𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹 = 𝑞𝑞 �𝐹𝐹 + 𝜖𝜖𝐹𝐹, 
where 𝑞𝑞 �𝐹𝐹 is the mean output and 𝜖𝜖𝐹𝐹 is an error term reflects uncertainties in production; 𝜖𝜖𝐹𝐹 is 
independent and identically distributed across producers and has a zero mean and constant 
variance 𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖𝐹𝐹
2 . The producer knows 𝑞𝑞 �𝐹𝐹.
6
(8) 
 For the new technology, the profit function is expressed 
as 
𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡) = 𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺(𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺),   
where we assume constant marginal costs  𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺
′ (𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺) > 0  and 𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 is the price of the good produced 
using the GM technology. Output per animal 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 from the new technology is 𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 = 𝑞𝑞 �𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡, 
where 𝜖𝜖𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 is an error term reflects uncertainties in production; 𝜖𝜖𝐺𝐺 is independent and identically 
distributed across producers and has a zero mean and constant variance 𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
2 . The distinguishing 
feature of the new technology is that its performance is unknown so the producer does not know 
𝑞𝑞 �𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 with certainty. He does, however, know 𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
2 . We assume that, at 𝑡𝑡 = 1, the producer’s prior 
belief is that the GM technology is more profitable than his existing technology, otherwise he 
would never adopt the GM technology since we exclude ‘learning from others’ in our model. We 
also impose the restriction that the producer does use the new technology on his entire herd at 
𝑡𝑡 = 1. Now that we have established our general framework, we will consider the decision model 
                                                   
5 In the case of crops, nt and N would represent the number of acres under the GM technology and the total number 
of acres, respectively. 
6 While the assumption of a constant (with error) output from using the old technology is somewhat restrictive, it 
greatly simplifies the analysis without affecting the main results of the study. 12 
 
in greater detail under different scenarios  regarding consumers’ beliefs about the quality 
difference between goods produced using the two technologies. 
 
Case 1 – Undifferentiated Products 
As our benchmark case, we consider what happens when the product produced using the existing 
technology, henceforth referred to as the non-GM good, and the product produced using the new 
technology, henceforth referred to as the GM good, are undifferentiated and consumers pay one 
price for the undifferentiated good. In Bayesian updating, the first few draws have a larger effect 
on the producer’s beliefs regarding the profitability of the GM technology than later draws. As 
the producer gains experience (i.e., after a large number of draws), his prior becomes tighter (i.e., 
the distribution has a smaller variance) and the new information acquired each period has less of 
an impact on shaping his  beliefs. Whether or not the producer ultimately disadopts rbST is 
determined to a large extent by what happens in the initial few draws after adoption. This leads 
to the hypothesis that if producers do disadopt rbST, it is most likely to occur sooner rather than 
later.  
Substituting in equations (6), (7) and (8), we can rewrite equation (2) as the following:  
 
 (9) 











Because the GM good and the non-GM good are undifferentiated, they receive a single price 
𝑝𝑝 = 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹 = 𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡. Taking the first order necessary condition of (9) yields: 
(10)  𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡
′(𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡) = �𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺(𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺)� − �𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹 − 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹(𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹)� − 𝜙𝜙�𝑁𝑁(𝜌𝜌𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹 − 𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹
2) + 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡(𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
2 + 𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹
2 − 2𝜌𝜌𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹)�.    
Solving for 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡





�𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺(𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺)� − �𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹 − 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹(𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹)� + 𝑁𝑁𝜙𝜙(𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹




,   
 
where  𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗  describes the optimal intensity of GM adoption. In the case of rbST, 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗  would 
represent the number of cows to inject with rbST whereas in the case of crops, 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗ would describe 
the number of acres  planted with the GM variety. After the decision is made,  the producer 
observes the actual return to using the new technology in period t and revises his prior beliefs 
about its profitability in a Bayesian manner. Specifically, the producer revises his prior regarding 
the anticipated output from using the GM technology.  
Before continuing with market-level considerations, it will be useful to examine  two 
comparative statics under this baseline case: (1) the change in 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗ with respect to a change in the 
herd size and; (2) with respect to a change in the anticipated profit differential between the new 
and existing technology.  Assuming a (weakly) convex cost function  (i.e., non-decreasing 
marginal costs), in order for 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗ to be a maximum the denominator 𝜙𝜙(𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
2 + 𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹
2 − 2𝜌𝜌𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹) must 













> 𝜌𝜌 . 
 
If the above condition holds, as the size of the herd (or number of acres) increases, the producer 
will choose to adopt the GM technology to a larger extent if the ratio of the variance of the 
returns to using the non-GM technology is greater than the covariance of the returns from the 












where ∆𝜋𝜋 = �𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺(𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺)� − �𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹 − 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹(𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹)�.  Not surprisingly, as the profit differential 
between using the GM technology and the old technology increases, the producer chooses to use 
the new technology to a greater extent. 
  The supply of the GM product is: 
 (14)  𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡(𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗) = 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡.      
The supply of the non-GM product is:  
(15)  𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹(𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗) = (𝑁𝑁 −𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗)𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹,      
and the total supply of the product is: 
(16)  𝑠𝑠(𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗) = 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 + (𝑁𝑁 −𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗)𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹.     
If we have 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃 identical producers, the aggregate supply is  
(17)  ????(𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗) = 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃(𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 + (𝑁𝑁 − 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗)𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹).     
On the demand side, we assume a market with 𝑀𝑀
𝐶𝐶 total consumers who may choose to consume 
one unit of the undifferentiated good or none at all. Each consumer is endowed with income E 
and derives some (indirect) utility 𝜃𝜃 from the consumption of the good, where 𝜃𝜃 is distributed 
uniformly  [0,1]. Consumers consume a unit of the good if  𝐸𝐸 − 𝑝𝑝 + 𝜃𝜃 > 𝐸𝐸, otherwise they 
consume nothing and get utility E. Therefore, demand is: 
(17)  ????(𝑝𝑝) = (1− 𝑝𝑝)𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶.     
Equilibrium conditions are met when demand equals supply, or 
(18)  ????(𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗) = ????(𝑝𝑝), or 
𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃(𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 + (𝑁𝑁 − 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗)𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹)  = (1 −𝑝𝑝)𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶.   
 
  The goods are undifferentiated so there is a single price, and the decision to continue 
using the new technology depends on the producer’s prior knowledge and the initial returns from 
the GM technology. It does not depend on the demand for the goods, except through the price 15 
 
associated with total supply, 𝑝𝑝(𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃(𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 + (𝑁𝑁 − 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗)𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹) ).   Solving (18), we obtain an 
analytical solution for the equilibrium price: 
(19) 
𝑝𝑝∗ =
𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙(𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶 − 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹)− 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃(𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺 −𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹)(𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 − 𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺 + 𝑁𝑁𝜙𝜙𝑁𝑁)




where 𝑁𝑁 = 𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹
2 − 𝜌𝜌𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹, 𝜙𝜙 = 𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
2 + 𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹
2 − 2𝜌𝜌𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹, and the arguments of the cost functions 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 
and 𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺 have been omitted for simplicity.  
 
Case 2 – Differentiated Products of Known Quality 
Now consider the case where consumers perceive a quality difference between the two goods. 
The key issue here is how consumers perceive the new good or how different they think it is 
from the traditional good. We assume that, because the technology only reduces per-unit costs 
and confers no known benefits and possible long term adverse health effects, consumers regard 
the new good as having lower quality than the traditional good, or 0 < 𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺 < 𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹 < 1, where 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 is 
a parameter for quality and the subscripts are the same as above. In this case, we assume that 
𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 = 𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺∀𝑡𝑡. We also assume that the price of the non-GM good 𝑝𝑝̅𝐹𝐹 is constant across time. 
Following Mussa and Rosen (1978), assume the market includes two differentiated, but 
substitutable, goods. The goods are vertically differentiated in the sense that one good is of a 
higher quality than the other. Given a choice between the two goods at the same price, all 
consumers would prefer the higher quality good to the lower quality good. Once again, our 
market consists of M consumers with equal income, E, and heterogeneous tastes represented by 
the parameter 𝜃𝜃. Each consumer can choose to buy nothing, one unit of the GM good, or one unit 
of the non-GM good. The utility from consuming one unit of good i is 𝑈𝑈 = 𝐸𝐸 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 where 16 
 
𝑖𝑖 ∈ (𝐺𝐺,𝐹𝐹). To find the consumer who is indifferent between consuming nothing and consuming 
one unit of the low quality good, we solve the following equation: 
(20)  𝐸𝐸 = 𝐸𝐸 − 𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 +𝜃𝜃0𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺.   
This yields 𝜃𝜃0𝑡𝑡 =
𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺
. Consumers with taste parameter 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃0𝑡𝑡 do not purchase the good. To find 
the customer indifferent between the high quality good and the low quality good, we solve the 
following equation: 
(21)  𝐸𝐸 − 𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 +𝜃𝜃1𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺 = 𝐸𝐸 −𝑝𝑝̅𝐹𝐹 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹.   








Figure 1. Consumption decision with differentiated products and heterogeneous consumers 
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The direct demand functions are: 
(22a)  ????𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝̅𝐹𝐹,𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡) = 𝑄𝑄𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = �1 −
𝑝𝑝̅𝐹𝐹 − 𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹 − 𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺
�𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶   
and 






�𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶.   






�𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡�𝑄𝑄𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡,𝑄𝑄𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡�𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺(𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺)� − �𝑝𝑝 �𝐹𝐹𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹 − 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹(𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹)� + 𝑁𝑁𝜙𝜙(𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹






The difference now is that we have differentiated products and, accordingly, different prices. The 
aggregate supply of the non-GM product is: 
(24)  ????𝐹𝐹(𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗) = 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃(𝑁𝑁 − 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗)𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹.      
The aggregate supply of the GM product is:  
(25)  ????𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡(𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗) = 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃(𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡).      
At equilibrium, the following market clearing conditions are satisfied: 
(26a)  ????𝐹𝐹(𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗) = ????𝐹𝐹(𝑝𝑝̅𝐹𝐹,𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡), or 
𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃(𝑁𝑁 − 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡






























where 𝑁𝑁 = 𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹
2 − 𝜌𝜌𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹, 𝜙𝜙 = 𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
2 + 𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹
2 − 2𝜌𝜌𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹, ∆𝐾𝐾 = 𝐾𝐾𝐹𝐹 − 𝐾𝐾𝐺𝐺 > 0,∆𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺 − 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 > 0 and 
once again the arguments of the cost functions 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 and 𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺 have been omitted for simplicity. 
If consumers are able to differentiate the GM good from the non-GM good and if they 
perceive the GM good to be inferior in quality, then 𝑝𝑝̅𝐹𝐹 ≥ 𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡. If 𝑝𝑝̅𝐹𝐹 = 𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡, then consumers will 
either choose the non-GM good or nothing at all. Consequently, ceteris paribus, 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
∗ will be lower 
in the case of differentiated products because  
�𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡(𝑄𝑄𝐹𝐹,𝑄𝑄𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡)𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺(𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺) − 𝑝𝑝̅𝐹𝐹𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹 − 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹(𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹)� < �𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺(𝑞𝑞𝐺𝐺) − 𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹 − 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹(𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹)�. 
The lower price that the producer receives for the GM good offsets to some extent any cost-
reduction benefits of the new technology, reducing the producer’s net gain relative to case 1. In 
this scenario, consumers know the quality level of both GM and non-GM goods. This may be a 
strong assumption but in the case of rbST, there is a significant amount of information in the 
public realm. While most producers may disagree with how the typical consumer values the 
milk, it is not unreasonable to assume that they know what it is.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper’s main contribution is the incorporation of consumer-driven market-level effects into 
the technology choice decision. There has been much effort put into the discovery and 
introduction of agricultural biotechnologies in the adoption literature, and separate efforts in the 
food labeling literature to measure its acceptance by consumers. However, very little has been 
done that integrates the two by examining the interactions between micro-level decisions and 
market-level outcomes when product differentiation is a factor. If product differentiation leads to 
price differences, then this will affect the technology choice decision.  From a policy standpoint, 
our results suggest that output-enhancing and/or cost-reducing technologies may not be readily 19 
 
adopted if these new technologies result in differentiated products. Therefore, it would behoove 
the manufacturers of these technologies as well as the producers who adopt them to spend 
resources to educate the public about the true nature of their products and the impact, if any, of 
the new technology. More broadly, our results suggest that product differentiation may affect the 
extent and speed of diffusion. 
  Future work will include considering the case where the consumer’s beliefs regarding the 
quality of the GM good vis-à-vis the non-GM good evolve over time. This would occur if 
perceptions about quality are influenced by new information and/or interaction with other 
consumers who share different beliefs. Another natural extension is to set up a numerical 
mathematical programming model using the results from the analytical model and calibrated to 
conform to known estimates of supply and demand elasticities to simulate the adoption, diffusion 
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